Wednesday, 6 September 2017

Observable or observed?

In my previous post I discussed some difficulties with the observable/unobservable distinction in constructive empiricism (CE). Here I'll focus on a related problem, the distinction between the observable and the observed.

Extreme constructive empiricism

In accepting that our best scientific theories correctly describe all observable phenomena, CE goes far beyond the empirical evidence. Most of what is observable will never be observed. Consider this position, which I will call "extreme constructive empiricism" or "ECE" for short: our best theories are true for the observed phenomena, but we should be agnostic about everything else. Why not adopt this more sceptical position? There are some obvious benefits to ECE. In holding that science delivers truth about the observable, two common arguments for antirealism are unavailable to CE:

(1) The pessimistic induction. Put briefly, this argument goes as follows: (P1) Most scientific theories accepted in the past have been rejected; (C) so, most currently accepted theories will be rejected in the future.

However, every case in which claims about unobservables have been rejected has also involved rejection of claims about observables. Those theories that we rejected in the past were rejected because they conflicted with observations. If our current theories are going to be rejected in the future, this will presumably be because they confront new observations that contradict them. So no antirealist who takes current accepted theories to be true for observable phenomena could endorse the pessimistic induction. Obviously this difficulty doesn't arise for the ECEist who only takes those theories to be true of the observed phenomena.

(2) The underdetermination argument. This argument rests on the claim that for any theory that correctly describes observable phenomena, there are numerous other theories that also correctly describe observable phenomena but that make different claims about unobservables. Again, it is easy to see that this can be run against CE, because for any theory that correctly describes what has been observed, there are numerous other theories that also correctly describe what has been observed but that make different claims about observable-but-as-yet-unobserved phenomena.

So what is the justification for belief in the observable over the merely observed? I will discuss two arguments.

The aim of science

First, Van Fraassen and Monton argue that CE is an attempt to describe the aim of science, with an assumption that the behaviour of scientists is rational. If the aim of science were truth about the merely observed, rather than the observable, then:
there would be no scientific reason for someone to do an experiment which would generate a phenomenon that had never been observed before. But one of the hallmarks of good scientists is that they perform experiments pushing beyond the limits of what has been observed so far.
Suppose I develop a theory of galaxy evolution that accommodates all that has been observed so far. I could derive further predictions from this theory, and then probe the sky to check if those predictions are accurate. But if the aim of science is simply truth about what has been observed, why bother? My theory already achieves this aim; it is therefore as good as any theory could possibly be. It would be unreasonable to risk turning an perfect theory into an imperfect one by making further observations that could contradict it. By contrast, in holding that the aim of science is truth about the observable, CE accommodates the fact that scientists spend so much time generating new observations.

There are a couple of things to say about this. First, assuming that it even makes sense to talk of the aim of science as a whole (as opposed to the aims of particular scientists or particular research groups), why would we suppose that science has only one aim? Two others goals that science plausibly aims at are the discovery of new phenomena and the manipulation and control of natural phenomena. If science aims at discovery, that immediately makes it rational for scientists to make new observations. If science aims at control and manipulation, new observations are always worthwhile because the more we know about the world, the better we are at controlling and manipulating it.

Second, we must distinguish the aim of science from the epistemology of science. Just because science aims at empirical adequacy, it doesn't follow that we should believe that our best theories are empirically adequate. Perhaps science sometimes falls short of its aims. After all, we all know that science has developed over time, and we hope that it will continue to develop in the future, that in the future it will be closer to achieving its aims than it is today. So the question remains, why suppose that our scientific theories save the observable phenomena, rather than merely save the observed phenomena?

Epistemic risk

A second argument for belief in the observable is hinted at by van Fraassen in his contribution to Churchland & Hooker's Images of Science. Although this is stated as an argument against realism, we can use the ideas here to support CE over ECE:
If I believe the theory to be true and not just empirically adequate, my risk of being shown wrong is exactly the risk that the weaker, entailed belief will conflict with actual experience. Meanwhile, by avowing the stronger belief, I place myself in the position of being able to answer more questions, of having a richer, fuller picture of the world, a wealth of opinion so to say, that I can dole out to those who wonder. But, since the extra opinion is not additionally vulnerable, the risk is — in human terms — illusory, and therefore so is the wealth. ... What can I do except express disdain for this appearance of greater courage in embracing additional beliefs which will ex hypothesi never brave a more serious test?
The realist believes everything the CEist believes, but the realist also holds additional beliefs that cannot face any additional tests. As Kukla (pg 98) puts it, van Fraassen seems to adopt a "vulnerability criterion of belief". Two theories are equivalently vulnerable when they are disconfirmed by precisely the same observations. Van Fraassen holds that if two theories are equivalently vulnerable, we should believe the theory that is logically weaker.

CE is obviously riskier than ECE, since the CEist is committed to beliefs about what has not yet been observed whereas the ECEist is agnostic about this. The two positions are not equally vulnerable. Of course, this is not yet an argument for CE. Indeed, if anything this looks like an argument against CE: intuitively, if a belief is riskier, if it is more likely to be wrong, then that is a reason not to hold that belief.

But notice that if our goal is simply to minimize the risk of holding false beliefs, then we should become radical sceptics and believe nothing at all (or perhaps we should believe a few propositions that we think are beyond doubt, but certainly we should believe nothing substantial about the world). Clearly we have other goals. There are, broadly speaking, two types of epistemic error: type I errors consist in believing what is false; type II errors consist in failing to believe what is true. Attempting to avoid one type of error pulls us in a different direction than attempting to avoid the other type, and an important question in epistemology and philosophy of science is how to balance these two goals.

Here is a simple suggestion: We avoid type I errors through the vulnerability criterion of belief; don't hold beliefs that go beyond what can be tested empirically. We avoid type II errors by holding the strongest possible beliefs given the vulnerability constraint. This is exactly what CE does. ECE makes very severe type II errors: to be agnostic about everything beyond what has been observed entails total agnosticism about the future, and this would be disastrous even assuming that it's psychologically possible. ECE undoubtedly commits fewer type I errors than CE, but the price in type II errors is simply too high.

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